HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS have been raising alarms about the treatment of Christians in China. A report from Open Doors World Watch List said that Asia is “the new hotbed of persecution for Christians.” Some Chinese church leaders are saying, “It’s the worst since the Cultural Revolution ended in 1976,” according to an Open Doors spokesperson.
Over the past 30 years, China has undergone one of the largest social and economic transformations ever seen. Nearly a billion people moved from peasantry to a modern middle-class lifestyle. While this change involved enormous economic progress for many people, it also entailed massive migrations, deep reorganization of family structures, and extensive urbanization. These came with growing social inequalities, rampant corruption, and environmental disasters.
In 2012, Xi Jinping was appointed as the new general secretary of the Communist Party; he became president in 2013. Xi has required extreme party loyalty and encouraged various economic reforms. Although his policy reduced corruption and smoothed the country’s transition, the changes have not protected China from a concerning economic slowdown.
In the context of this massive transformation, what specific difficulties affect Chinese Christians?
China has gained more Christian believers over the past 40 years, with the number of Chinese Protestants increasing by an average of 10 percent per year since the late 1970s, but Christians still represent only 2 to 4 percent of China’s population. Despite their increase, Christians are neither a threat to social cohesion nor a major political challenge to Beijing. The state is far more concerned about a trade war with the U.S., China’s aging population, and environmental damage. And, despite its communist legacy, Beijing is not specifically obsessed with religion, or Christianity in particular.
The Chinese state—like every other state—operates under its own political tradition and in relation to its own national culture. Chinese religious policy is not only defined by a supposedly coherent national law but also through the agency of local officials who play a key role in its implementation. In practice, state control is heterogeneous and varies from district to district. It relies on the balance of power between local officials, religious actors, social needs, and regional history.
In some places, local officials have imposed stricter regulation and monitoring on Christians and other social actors. In other places, they have destroyed Christian churches and jailed a few leaders. But in my view, this does not represent a general crackdown on Christianity. It reflects instead the Chinese policy of “killing a chicken to scare the monkeys”—applying a heavy hand on one group is publicized to push others toward self-limitation and censorship.
The Chinese state says it has increased its control over its citizens for the sake of “progress,” and many Chinese Christians are proud of the national transformation that the party has produced. Yet others are concerned with the revival of traditional religions and wonder how to better proclaim the presence of Christ in their changing society. The most urgent and concrete tasks for these Christians center around converting family members and friends.
Many Chinese Christians avoid a confrontational relationship with the state. They prioritize service to their neighbors, engaging with non-Christians in many ways, including through online testimonies, promoting outdoor group calisthenics , hosting large Christmas parties with coworkers, and sponsoring Christian homes for the elderly.
However, Christians feel the heavier presence of the administration in an era of increased state control on all sectors of society. Over the last few years, Christian communities have seen their capacities to freely engage with the broader society narrow, in a few places dangerously so.
Those who care about the church in China should remember that Chinese Christians are not homogeneous. They represent a vast theological and ecclesiological spectrum and are often at risk of being used as pawns within international political rivalries as well as by their own state.
Michel Chambon, a Catholic theologian and anthropologist, studies the growth of Protestantism in China. He has made regular visits to China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong for the past 16 years.
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