A Step Toward Disarmament?

Perhaps. But don't put away your banners ...

In the age-old fable "The Lion and the Rat," the mighty lion is ensnared in a trap so strong that even its powerful strainings for freedom are to no avail. The other animals of the jungle, alas, are also unable to help the king of beasts. Finally, along comes a wee rodent, who is able to chew through the ropes and free the lord of the jungle. Perseverance and patience are able to succeed where brute strength failed.

For at least 10 years, citizens' peace and justice movements the world over have been gnawing away in earnest at the nuclear ropes enslaving humanity. The Reagan-Gorbachev summit in December gave some evidence that the ropes, at long last, are beginning to fray.

The visit of Mikhail Gorbachev and the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty was unprecedented in the atomic age, and not just because the agreement promises for the first time to eliminate a class of nuclear weapons. Much more significant was the perceptible change in the way the arms race is being discussed and the possibilities thus created for a new way of looking at the world of the 1990s.

The summit gave indisputable evidence that cooperation with the Soviets is possible and that when the political will exists progress can be achieved in the struggle against the common enemy of nuclear weapons. The desire for a treaty withered the many excuses that have long blocked an arms agreement between the nuclear-armed behemoths.

In the midst of all the pomp and pageantry of the summit, enough of the humanity of the visitors showed through, especially on television, to allow a crack in the wall of America's stereotyped image of the Soviet people. Real concerns remain about human rights and the Soviet system. But the new opening of communications could also open arenas other than the battlefield for confronting those issues. This, too, bodes well for a future with perhaps a little less bellicosity and a little more understanding between peoples.

The INF treaty that emerged from the heady atmosphere of the summit does more than eliminate a few thousand warheads from the grossly bloated nuclear arsenals. The treaty is a significant breakthrough, if for no other reason than that it demonstrates such a thing is possible. The process now set in motion -- if properly nurtured, nudged, and pushed -- could well create a momentum toward the realization of real security and perhaps even peace.

WHAT BROUGHT RONALD REAGAN to the negotiating table was not a sudden conversion to peace. Reagan has tried hard to take credit for the success of the treaty, but it is clear that without the change in Soviet leadership the new spirit of openness and goodwill would have been unthinkable.

For the first time in the atomic age, the Soviets admitted that major cutbacks can be made in the nuclear arsenals without endangering national security, a familiar refrain of the peace movement heretofore rejected by both superpowers. In a series of bold, unprecedented strokes, the new Soviet leadership accepted on-site inspection, agreed to ignore British and French missiles, retreated from an unequivocal position on Star Wars research, and finally accepted a treaty cutting four times as many Soviet warheads as American. Desperately in need of a distraction from the deepening morass of the Iran-Contra scandal and hungry for a more revered place in the history books, Reagan welcomed the opportunity to change his role from defendant to diplomat.

The much-touted "openness" in the Soviet Union has been dramatically exemplified in the process leading up to the treaty. Most significant is the new Soviet willingness to allow on-site inspection to ensure compliance with the treaty. One commentator went so far as to say the treaty should be called the "On-Site Inspection Treaty" because of this break-through, which opens the door for further arms-cutting deals.

But while important as a precursor of things to come, the treaty has very little military significance. It leaves untouched thousands of nuclear warheads in Europe on short-range battlefield weapons, in some ways the weapons most likely to precipitate a nuclear war. And the destructive work of the withdrawn Euromissiles can still be accomplished by weapons based in the United States or on submarines.

If our military planners get their way, removing the missiles from Europe will become the rationale for "modernizing" battlefield nuclear weapons and expanding conventional forces in Europe, for multiplying air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and for producing more-lethal submarine missiles. These moves would help ensure that, while warhead numbers may be reduced, the technological arms race will spiral into the 1990s unchecked.

For real progress toward peace, the two nations will need to do much more than the next promised step, cutting their strategic arsenals in half. Such a move, while important in psychology and symbolism, leaves intact the real nuclear threat contained in the first-strike weapons of both sides. Eliminating the oldest, slowest, and least accurate weapons while continuing to push the cutting edge of technical development on earth and in the heavens does nothing to make the world a safer place.

The litmus test of good faith, and the logical first step, of the peace process is still a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing, which would stop the deployment of new systems. No legitimate arguments remain for continuing nuclear weapons tests, and an end to testing would show the world the two new peacemakers mean business.

A superpower thaw must also extend beyond changes in weaponry to address areas of political conflict. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the ending of the U.S.-backed war against Nicaragua, respect for human rights, the honoring of religious and political liberty, the opening of political space for Eastern Europe, collaboration for a just Middle East settlement -- all are components of real security. And all are legitimate and worthwhile next steps for the pursuit of peace.

There is a grave danger in the treaty process, and that is the risk that it will lull the public to sleep. The price of peace is eternal vigilance, and we cannot for a moment relinquish the responsibility of peacemaking to those in power who, after all, created the crisis in the first place.

It took years of persistent organizing and action by dedicated people of conscience and faith the world over to change the political climate in a way that made the new treaty possible. A break in such efforts now would be a great disaster.

Whether the signing of the INF treaty is a real step toward disarmament will ultimately be judged by what happens in the days ahead. The message for the peace movement is: Have the well-deserved celebration, but don't put away your banners and your marching shoes just yet.

Jim Rice is editor of Sojourners.

This appears in the February 1988 issue of Sojourners