As debates go, it wasn’t much--a couple of amendments to the bill authorizing funds for ERDA (Energy Research and Development Agency), one of the successors to the old Atomic E Commission. But for at least a few moments in 1975 and 1976, members of the House and Senate were asked to face reality on one of the more irrational aspects of U.S. foreign and military policy. Unfortunately, those who urged the amendments faced an insurmountable obstacle. They had facts to back up their position--but these were largely dismissed.
The facts were that the United States has developed an overwhelmingly powerful nuclear arsenal, far in excess of the needs of even the wildest Dr. Strangelove. But nuclear weapons production has continued. In recent years production of nuclear weapons has been estimated at more than a thousand a year, or three per day. Today, while the government refuses to disclose the number of U.S. weapons, officials do not dispute figures by the Washington Center for Defense Information, headed by Admiral Gene LaRocque (retired) that the United States has:
9,000 strategic weapons, ready to be fired from land-based missiles and submarines, or dropped from SAC bombers.
22,000 tactical weapons (shorter range, but sometimes more powerful), including 7,000 in Europe and 1,700 in Asia, including an estimated 600 in South Korea.
The proposition by Rep. Bella Abzug in the House and Senator Mike Gravel in the Senate was simple: eliminate funds for the further production of fissionable nuclear material for use in weapons. Savings of more than one billion dollars next year would result, according to Abzug’s calculations. Her line of argument was modest. She argued that the nuclear weapons issue should be separated from a bill dealing with overall energy issues. On a roll call vote May 20 she lost 97-286, about the same margin as in 1975 when there had been more discussion of deterrence, limited nuclear war, and the role of civil defense.
In the Senate, June 25, Mike Gravel met the issue head-on. He called for no further production unless Congress approved. His amendment also opposed further deployment unless the president recommended it and Congress did not disapprove it. In addition, he called for public disclosure of the total number of U.S. nuclear weapons deployed and stored and their explosive yield.
“What Congress would be saying in passing this amendment is simply, ‘If 30,000 atomic bombs [ to all bombs dropped in] 4,000 World War II are not enough to defend us, then what will be enough? If you believe we need more, you must explain why.”
For his pains, Gravel incurred the wrath of Sen. John Pastore, then chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and member of the powerful Appropriations Committee: “Sure this is an ugly world in many respects. Sure, we have bombs up to our necks that can burn this world 25, 30 times over. Do you not think I regret that? But this [disclosing the number of nuclear weapons deployed and stored] is unilateral disarmament and this is suicide . . . All [the American people] want to know is--can we protect their freedom, can we keep this country free. That is what they want to know.”
Confident that withholding such in formation from the public would keep the country free, Pastore called for a vote and won 77-5. Joining Sen. Gravel in this 1976 edition of “Profiles in Courage” were Abourezk and McGovern of South Dakota, Hathaway of Maine, and Proxmire of Wisconsin.
Psychiatrists may have more to contribute to an understanding of our present situation than political scientists. Sen. Gravel noted, “Adding ever greater overkill capability--the second and the third TNT equivalent ton for every human being on the planet, or the 40th time we can evaporate every large Soviet city--is not defense: it is paranoia.”
Is it paranoia? Or as the “red scare” recedes, is it a product of many mundane circumstances? Generals and admirals may play it safe to further their careers. Bureaucrats are caught in a Parkinson’s law of expanding programs. Senators and Representatives defer to the experts, unwilling to risk their political futures. Workers, store keepers, and community leaders need jobs and payrolls.
Rationality is certainly not a hallmark of U.S. nuclear policy. U.S. allies, for example might well be destroyed while they are being defended. This is not just a theoretical matter. The pattern was set in Ben Tre in Vietnam when a U.S. army major noted, “It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.”
Proponents of limited nuclear war also seem to have certain highly optimistic assumptions about human nature under stress. Leaders of “enemy” nations are expected to act with restraint while their family and friends die and large areas of the nation are destroyed. They seem to downplay the intensity of public pressure to strike back and escalate, though the Mayaguez incident suggests U.S. leaders and the public may not act with cool logic under stress.
Proponents of nuclear weapons tell us they are not advocating their use, but only protecting us from the threat that they will be used. And yet they oppose any U.S. declaration that it will refrain either from a first-strike against the U.S.S.R. or first use in war anywhere in the world. They point out that “deterrence” has kept the peace in the nuclear age. That says something, but not much. It is rather like the old story of the man who fell off the skyscraper and shouted, as he plummeted past the tenth floor, “I’m doing all right so far.”
Deterrence itself seems to be based on the ultimate irrationality. It must rely on the common sense and rationality, and ultimately the humanity, of those we distrust the most. But if the U.S.leaders are willing to trust enemies to refrain from nuclear war, or to keep it limited in the heat of battle, why don’t they trust them to keep peace agreements in the mutual interest of both parties?
The Department of Defense, try as it may by obfuscation and euphemism, cannot hide the fact that it has utterly failed in its mission to protect the people of the United States from a nuclear attack. The official budget for 1976 said the Department of Defense hopes to deter an attack, and “if deterrence fails, ensure an outcome favorable to the United States.” Unsurprisingly, it did not describe how a nuclear war following the failure of deterrence could ever result in a “favorable” outcome for the United States.
The Pentagon’s insuperable task is complicated even further by growing prospects that nuclear weapons will be obtained by political groups within or among nations. It probably clarifies thinking to refrain from using the usual words, “terrorist groups.” Those words imply that it is acceptable for a nation- state to obtain and prepare to use nuclear weapons, but if a non-national group does the same it is for “terrorist” purposes. There was a considerable amount of terror in that golden autumn of 1962 as U.S. and Soviet threats were exchanged. Nations can also commit terrorist acts, as the villagers of Indochina know very well.
The foreign policy created by U.S. and Soviet leaders since World War II is filled with irony. In the name of peace the world is on the verge of unimaginable destruction. Our treasure has been spent to purchase military security but we have never been more insecure. Those who have sought to control men and events have become almost completely vulnerable to irrational acts.
There is ample cause for great and powerful people and nations to question their basic assumptions and policies. National insecurity is here to stay. Even the goal of a disarmed world under law cannot be risk free. But in the turbulent and unpredictable future, cooperation, nonviolence, and commitment to justice all offer a better guide for constructive action that the fear and suspicion which pervades our present age.
When this article appeared, Ed Snyder was Executive Secretary for the Friends Committee on National Legislation, and had been deeply involved in working for arms control in the U.S. Congress. He was a correspondent in Washington, D.C., for Sojourners.
Got something to say about what you're reading? We value your feedback!