Nicaragua: Bordering on Reconciliation

A Miskito pastor reflects on the tension between his people and the Nicaraguan government.

Norman Bent is a Miskito Indian and a Moravian pastor whose home is on Nicaragua's East Coast. Many Miskito villages are located along the Rio Coco, the river that divides Nicaragua from Honduras. In recent months some Miskitos have crossed the border and joined the counterrevolutionary forces in Honduras.

A long history of mistrust has existed between the Spanish-speaking people of the West Coast and the Indians, Sumo and Rama as well as Miskito, in the East. In the interview that follows, Bent outlines that history, the current situation, and his hopes for the future relationship between his people and the Sandinista government.

At the time of the interview, Bent was under government order not to return to the East Coast. The day before we left Nicaragua that ban was lifted by the Sandinista leadership.

We interviewed Bent, in a Moravian church in Managua, where he is temporarily serving as pastor. The church also serves as a refugee center for Miskitos who have fled the frontier, where their villages have suffered attacks from across the border. Many of the refugees have relatives who have been accused by the government of being counterrevolutionaries and have been imprisoned in Managua.

The prayer "Under One Common Hope," was offered by Bent at the close of our time with him and is included in this issue. --The Editors

We read a great deal in the press in the United States about the tension between the Nicaraguan government and the Miskito Indians. Could you describe the current situation?

The Sandinista government has recognized its mistakes in its approach to the integration of the East Coast with the revolutionary process, as it has tried to make that region a part of the national system of reconstruction. The government is trying to undo its mistakes, and the relationship with the Moravian church has improved in the last few weeks.

The government representative in the area has extended a safe conduct letter to our pastors. Each of them has an ID card so the security officers will not bother them. We think this is a recognition of the church's role in the East Coast communities and a great step forward in trying to undo some of the mistakes that were made in trying to integrate our people--for whom the revolution was also made.

What is the history of the tension that exists between the Miskitos and the government?

The Indian liberation movement began in 1973 with a Moravian Miskito Indian pastor from a commercial town on the river between Honduras and Nicaragua. This pastor was very disturbed by abuses made against the Indian people by the Chinese, who ran the commerce, and by the Nicaraguan Spanish-speaking people who had moved there from the West to do business.

We tried to organize a political Indian cooperative with a loan from a Nicaraguan development foundation, a private enterprise organization funded by U.S. AID. The loan was approved, but when the Indian cooperative sent some of its members to Puerto Cabezas to cash the check, they were arrested by the police, who took the money. The Indians were accused by Somoza's people of organizing a subversive, communist, anti-government movement. The cooperative was almost smashed apart.

A year later the same people organized a regional assembly to which they invited Indian delegations from many villages. Somoza refused to give permission for their assembly. However, more than 600 people came, and permission was then given, but with heavy military patrol.

Helicopters flew over the village for four days while the meeting took place. Somoza tried again to break up the organization, and this time people decided to form an alliance of Miskito and Sumo Indians to work for cultural survival and for our own development.

The new alliance was called Alpromisu, Alliance for the Progress of Miskito and Sumo Indians, and it was the first Indian organization other than the Moravian church and the local tribal governments. The Somoza government refused to give it legal recognition.

Somoza said, "The only way my government can give you legal recognition is by your changing your name." He wanted them to take the "L" out of the name because he didn't want anything that spoke of alliance, which for him was a sort of communism. So the Indians were forced to change the name from Alpromisu to Apromisu. Yet Somoza still refused to give them legal recognition. But he did provide government jobs for the leaders of the organization in order to buy their support.

In 1978, when the first insurrection movement took place in western Nicaragua, the FAO, a coalition of 14 political parties and labor unions, invited Apromisu to join them in a common front against Somoza. However, the leadership of Apromiso did not think that this was the time to join the front. Steadman Fagoth, a university student at the time, and others accused the leadership of selling out to Somoza. When the triumph of the revolution took place in '79, the leadership was pushed out, and Steadman and two other young students took over the leadership of the organization.

In November, 1979, Commandante Daniel Ortega came to an assembly in Puerto Cabezas, which was attended by 900 delegates from all the East Coast villages. Ortega tried to master the organization, and people refused to do what he proposed. After he returned to Managua he said that the organization could continue as the vanguard of a revolutionary grassroots organization among the Indian villages, provided it change its name to Misurasata, meaning in Miskito language, the Sandinista Unity of Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Indians.

The people accepted the name change and reported to Commandante Ortega that it was an honor to include Sandinismo in their organization. They had defended Sandino against the U.S. Marines in his early days, and he was very meaningful to them.

But ever since there have been what we call isolated cultural shocks, cultural problems. Civilian and military government people who were transferred from the West to the East Coast to take over the government in the East seemed unable to interpret the desire of the government in Managua. The East Coast had been abandoned by the Somoza government and the West all these years, left to the mercy of God and the good will of the missionaries of both the Roman Catholic and the Moravian church. So these young Sandinistas did not have the cultural techniques to approach the Indian liberation movement or work with the church or the local leadership.

In addition, the Sandinista government discovered that Steadman Fagoth had been involved with the Somoza security office. Steadman's file had been discovered among the many left by the Somoza regime. In early 1981, Sandinista security officers kept a watch on him as he met with the U.S. embassy and right-wing political parties in Managua.

In the middle of February, Steadman was arrested. While arresting him, the Sandinista security arrested all of the leadership of Misurasata, both the top and the intermediate leadership, and even Miskito and Sumo young people who were finishing up at this time the literacy campaign in their native languages.

An attempt was made to arrest a young Miskito leader during a meeting in a Moravian church, where 600 young people had gathered to celebrate at the end of the literacy campaign. Four military men armed with machine guns walked into the church, and five others surrounded the building. While the minister was preaching, one of the military men stepped up to the pulpit and asked to speak. He said he was looking for the young Miskito leader; the young man lifted his hand and said, "I am he."

The military man asked, "Will you follow me?"

The young man replied, "We are in the midst of a religious ceremony. Can you wait until the ceremony is over? Then I will willingly follow you."

Another military man who was at the door shouted, "Why wait? Shoot him!" and opened fire. At that, the young people in the church jumped on the military men. Four civilians and four of the military were killed. The military men outside the church dropped their guns and ran.

The young people found the guns and went into the mountains. I worked on a peace commission trying to convince these young people to give up their guns and come back with me from the mountains. The Sandinista security office had offered them freedom and security. They returned, and as was promised, they were not bothered. But after this incident the young people lost all confidence in the new government.

The people held peaceful vigils of prayer and fasting in the churches, protesting the arrest of Steadman and demanding his freedom. The army made another mistake and sent troops into a church to force the people out. About 300 young people ran out of fear into Honduras--just the river separated them from that country--and the people who remained in Nicaragua got very angry with the government and stopped sending their children to school, refused to do any farming or accept any medical assistance. Some of the industrial plants, which had labor forces of Miskito Indians, were almost closed down. It was like a general strike on the East Coast.

The Indians hoped for a response from the government, including the release of Steadman Fagoth, public recognition of the mistake made in the killing of the eight people in the arrest of the young Miskito leader, and a guarantee that Misurasata would be free to continue work as an Indian organization.

In response they received some harsh military actions, which was very, very sad. I'm sure that the military actions were not ordered from Managua; they were the actions of individual people.

Security officers in the area continued to make mistakes, and Miskitos kept running into Honduras; during the dry season, the people could just walk across the river. The frontier area around the border is land that the Indians are used to; the army of occupation knew nothing about the land and could not control the frontier. The presence of military people in their area was very much a shock to the Indians. Even Somoza had not had an army there.

By the middle of May, Steadman was released on three conditions. First, he would take at least five days to work on re-establishing a normal situation on the coast, with industries restored, the labor force working, children back in school, and medical services accepted. Second, Steadman would go into Honduras and bring back the young people who had fled there, which was a dangerous task since the somocistas were already there as counterrevolutionary forces making use of the Miskitos. Third, he would accept a scholarship to study in a socialist country for a year and then come back and work with his people.

Steadman went to the East Coast and talked to the people in a public meeting. About 50 people followed him into Honduras, where he declared on an underground radio station operated by somocistas that he was an enemy to the revolution and requested people to come into Honduras to build a liberation army.

That was the beginning of the serious problem with peace on the East Coast. I am not blaming Steadman alone for the mistakes. Neither do I blame the isolated military people.

If I were a Sandinista soldier today in a Miskito village, trying to defend it while the people do not care for me, I don't know how I would feel. I might think, "You did not shed your blood, we did, so who are you to take away my revolution?"

It's a racial thing. Historically the East Coast was dominated by Great Britain, while the West Coast was dominated by Spain. So the coasts have a difference of language, culture, and religion. On the East Coast the people are Moravians. On the West Coast they are Roman Catholics. The Miskito and Sumo Indians have an historical hatred for anybody who speaks Spanish. The word that the Miskitos use for Spaniard means "our enemy." This hatred was taught by Great Britain many, many years back.

The racism goes the other way too. On the West Coast they think of us as los hermanitos de la costa, "the little brothers of the coast." This means that we do not have the credentials of Nicaraguans.

What do you think is the intention of the government toward the people of the coast?

I think that there is an interest in making the coast a part of the total Nicaraguan process, of making eastern Nicaragua a subsystem of the national system. It's a desire to integrate the East Coast, but the charisma to make it happen is not there; and the early mistakes made by the government now serve as a wall against bringing about the integration.

So you would say that most people on the East Coast are resistant to becoming integrated with the rest of Nicaragua?

No, they are not resistant; they feel that they are a part of Nicaragua. But there is suspicion on both sides.

So the causes of the tension and violence are mistakes made by young security forces who didn't understand the culture, and the separation of the East and West historically combined with an historic racism. The West Coast has dominated the country, and while the racism has gone both ways, the racism of the West has been in power against the people in the East.

That's correct. And that racism could become worse if the coast is used by U.S. imperialism and counterrevolutionary forces to be a landing base from which to declare an independent government and then to invade Nicaragua.

This history of racism and some unfortunate mistakes are now being used by forces against the revolution?

The CIA and the Honduran army, also the somocistas, are using Steadman Fagoth and his team, and also many young Miskito people.

Do you personally trust the intentions of the leadership of the government toward the people?

Yes, I do.

Do you think there is a mutual desire for reconciliation?

I do for two reasons. One, because I have a personal theological conviction. Biblically, I believe in the poor and the future of the poor. I believe in Jesus Christ, who is the greatest liberator of humankind. I believe that the gospel tells me that the poor must enjoy the richness of this earth. And I fail to see that happen in a system of government that is not sharing the wealth of a country.

I also have a political, ideological conviction. I don't believe in capitalism as a system. I think it's finished. What I hope for in the Nicaraguan system is a model for the Third World. Therefore, I believe in the struggle of the revolution. Already I can see that this revolution has benefited the poor.

But I have a personal problem. The revolutionary leadership does not trust me because I am a church leader of the Indian people. Neither am I trusted by my own people, because of my revolutionary approach to interpreting the Scripture. So you see where I am: I am the meat of the sandwich.

But I have not yet been part of a church that is for peacemaking, that is ready for reconciliation, that is working toward a peaceful solution of the problem. I can't do otherwise than just be a prophet in this situation. And I feel that God is calling me to be here, even in spite of all of this mistrust.

Would you say more about Steadman Fagoth: his motivations, history, reasons for doing what he is doing, and his possible connections with the U.S. and outside forces?

I got to know the young man in '79, shortly after the triumph. I used to see his actions with his people, and he was very pro-Indian. What has happened to his aspiration, I don't know. I have no proof of his connection with the CIA or the right-wing political parties. But I know with my own eyes his connection with the Somoza security office during the insurrection. I have seen the documents.

He was in the pay of Somoza?

Right. The top man in the security office under Somoza gave him a scholarship to the university, and in exchange he had to report on the activities of some Sandinistas and even his own people, some of the Miskito leaders. I saw those documents also.

Even after he was found guilty of what he did under Somoza, he was given a second chance. If he really loved his people, he could have stayed in Nicaragua, and the people would not be suffering as they are. There would not have been so many refugees in Honduras. And even those early ones who went to Honduras would have come back. But I think he is doing what he is doing now out of revenge and hate.

How do you feel about the relocation of your people from the Rio Coco area? Do you think that it was necessary?

From a military perspective it was necessary, and also perhaps from a future social and economic view. But from an anthropological and Christian perspective, it really hurts when you take a people away from where they have lived for hundreds of years. So there are mixed feelings about it. I do support a move for military defense, for protection. On the other hand, it is very sad.

Was there violence done in the process of relocation?

I was not in the area. I was here in Managua, therefore I have no information of such. It was harsh; people had to walk. But I don't know whether there was violence. We have no evidence of it.

If there had been massacres, would you have heard about them?

We heard rumors, but there is no proof. Steadman Fagoth uses these rumors in his counterrevolutionary activities. He and others travel all over the world with such information.

How many Miskito Indians are in Honduras?

We hear many different figures, anywhere from 12,000 to 20,000. The Miskito, Sumo, and Rama Indian population in Nicaragua is about 120,000. So we are only talking about 10 per cent of the Indian population that has gone to Honduras.

What are your hopes for resolution of this tragic situation?

The Moravian church feels strongly that the CIA is using the Miskito problem as justification for its work against the Nicaraguan government. It is making use of Steadman Fagoth.

The CIA does not want a peaceful solution. The Moravian church has proposed to the government as well as to the Organization of American States (OAS) that it seek a peaceful solution, using the church to bring about a dialogue between the Honduran and Nicaraguan governments and the Miskito Indians, which would be supervised by international organizations such as the Red Cross, the OAS, and the U.N. High Commission on Refugees. We have requested the World Council of Churches--of which the Moravian church is a member--to try to bring about a peaceful solution. But we know that this recommendation is a blow in the face of Mr. Reagan and his team.

We believe that Mr. Reagan will not let it happen. We must have the cooperation of the Honduran government to bring about a peaceful solution. We've recommended that the Miskito Indians in Honduras be repatriated to their home villages and suggested the institution of a joint border patrol so that counterrevolutionary forces are taken away.

There are 400 to 500 Miskito Indians here in prison in Managua who have been arrested in the border area between January, 1982, and the present time. The prisoners have been accused of either being sympathetic to or taking an active part in the counterrevolutionary activities. It is a case again of racism, overreaction, and mistrust.

We hope that this situation will settle soon but, in view of present covert action by the CIA and the counterrevolutionary forces, that seems very far away. Each time the government makes an attempt to release these prisoners, there's something new that takes place and takes its attention away from the Miskito Indian problems.

Have any of the prisoners been involved in counterrevolutionary activities?

I have heard that about 2,000 Miskitos have joined the contras. The rest of the Miskitos in Honduras are refugees who fled because of fear.

For most of the Miskito Indians this is not a counterrevolution, not a military or political thing, but a tribal thing. For the Miskito Indians, each village represents a country, a nation. And the people within each village know that their people want to come back from Honduras, because life is too hard for them there. And some do come back and hide out in the villages. People take food to them, and security officers see that as counterrevolutionary. So the Indians are arrested, accused of counterrevolution, and given up to 30 years.

Do you feel you have access to the leaders of the revolution and that they're showing a desire to work out the problems mutually?

We are talking with Daniel Ortega and others. They have repeatedly said that they realize they have made a lot of mistakes and ask us what they can do to overcome them.

The West has an ideological, political liberation movement, with a desire to do wonderful things for its people. The Indians have their own liberation movement, different from the political, ideological movement. This our government is not able to understand, and I don't think they will understand it, because people are not explaining it to them. Those who are trying to explain it are not trusted.

But the relationship with the Moravian church, which was very bad at the beginning of 1982, is building back because of our talking to them very quietly and using the methods of peacemaking. We have tried to help them understand our culture on the coast. The Moravian church has been on the coast for 135 years; it's the church of the people.

The Miskito situation is very complicated, and it is getting worse now that the CIA is involved and using the Miskito people in Honduras, arming them to come and kill their own Nicaraguan brothers and sisters. This then makes the work of reconciliation that the Moravian church has taken up in Nicaragua much more difficult. We feel that the Nicaraguan government needs some breathing space. And unless the CIA pulls out of this situation, the Indian people will continue to suffer.

Will you be able to go back home to the East Coast?

Yes. The Moravian church and CEPAD, as well as the U.S. National Council of Churches, the United Church of Canada, and the World Council of Churches, have requested the government to let us go back. We are needed there on the East Coast to help with the reconciliation work.

When I think of not being able to go back to the East Coast, I think that each time the government comes to the deciding point to say, "Okay, Norman, here's a letter for you to go back to the coast," 75 children die, 24 soldiers are killed, a bridge is blown up, and so they have to redirect their attention to those problems. Therefore, I blame nobody but the CIA for what I am so afraid of--that my people are suffering and that the church is suffering.

Aren't you in a lot of danger from the counterrevolutionaries if you return?

Definitely.

Are there any leaders doing reconciliation work on the Nicaraguan side of the river?

Just the church leaders. The Miskito Indians have no leadership on the Nicaraguan side now. The leaders are all in Honduras or Costa. Rica. There is no Indian organization now, the Moravian church is the only organization that represents the Indian people and is doing reconciliation work between the government and the people.

The Moravian church lost more than 50 congregations to Honduras in 1982. We have almost 20 pastors there.

Are there any Sandinista Indian leaders in the government in Managua?

No. The church has told the government that the present administration on the East Coast of Nicaragua is a kind of colonialism because there is no Indian representation in the government. There is only one black from the East Coast in the Sandinista government.

We as a church want solidarity with the government that is critical, to be able to tell our government our criticism. Some people feel that such solidarity is dishonest. I keep telling them, "Unless you are critical of people you cannot help them overcome their problems." I think those in our government need criticism to help them.

I want to keep working with my government and have my church respected. Any criticism I make is because I am interested in the government and because I want to be helpful.