Bad Company in Angola

GEORGE BUSH'S preoccupation with the character of his opponent was a convenient way to draw attention away from the nasty characters he and previous administrations had been supporting in the name of foreign policy. The bloodshed following Angola's elections this fall are a clear example that although the Cold War may be over, the monsters created, funded, and sustained for those frigid battles are still with us—and still reigning terror in their home countries.

Jonas Savimbi, who had been courted by the White House and held up as a man fighting for the ideals of the "free world," showed his true colors after the country held its first elections September 29-30. Although the elections were declared free and fair by all international observers, Savimbi immediately called foul when early election returns indicated a strong lead for the former ruling party and President Eduardo Dos Santos.

In protest, he removed "his" UNITA soldiers from the unified army and retreated back to the region of Huambo in order to regroup for an apparent attack and renewal of the civil war. The worst was realized. As Americans were busy voting for their character of choice, Angolans were mopping up from a weekend of bloodshed in which more than 1,000 Angolans were killed in UNlTA offensives.

The scenario is all too familiar to the Angolans who witnessed Savimbi's turncoat tactics in 1975 when the country gained its independence from Portugal. That time, Savimbi's retreat and regrouping resulted in the death of almost one million Angolans during the 16-year civil war that followed. Savimbi purged UNITA leadership in the mid-1980s when his autocratic rule was beginning to be questioned from within the ranks.

During that war, civilians were the primary targets of UNITA attacks. The extensive use of landmines throughout southern Angola explains Angola's present distinction of having the highest number of amputees per capita in the world.

According to Trevor Edwards, a mercenary who defected from UNITA in 1980, women and children were frequently decimated. As he told British television:

These other kids popped up and started to run...some of them were completely naked. They'd taken their clothes off to show they weren't armed. We started shooting. We shot this young girl. She must have been about 5. And we shot her father. We shot about nine in all.

Such events earned Savimbi the title of "bandit without a human soul." The United States has been an active supporter of this bandit throughout his career. Although UNITA's existence was ensured by the complicity and support of colonial Portugal and South Africa, its ongoing survival was dependent on support from the United States.

Eager to bash communism wherever it was suspected to exist, yet still reeling from the embarrassment of direct involvement in Vietnam, the United States employed Savimbi and his army as pawns in a Cold War battle that the United States didn't dare fight itself.

The initial support in 1975 was issued through the CIA, which collaborated with South Africa and Zaire in the invasion of Angola. Impressed with neither the U.S. mission nor its bedpartners, Congress in December 1975 passed the Clark Amendment, which banned all covert aid to anti-government forces in Angola.

But the aid continued. Although it didn't show up in congressional ledgers, UNITA received substantial aid—including the gift of Stinger surface-to-air missiles through several back doors, such as Zaire and Namibia. Former CIA agent John Stockwell maintains that the CIA and other agencies have never respected the restrictions of the Clark Amendment.

AFTER RONALD REAGAN'S victory in 1980, renewed support emerged in the form of "information" campaigns aimed at creating a favorable image of UNITA among the American public, particularly by organizations with powerful influence on the administration such as the American Security Council (ASC), the Heritage Foundation, and the World Anti-Communist League. The influence of these organizations led to the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985 and the official recognition of UNITA in 1986, when Savimbi was received in the White House by Reagan himself.

With the Clark Amendment taken off the books, Congress was free to grant UNITA $15 million in covert military aid (which was renewed every following year, with a substantial increase by the Bush administration in 1989). By 1990, the U.S. aid to UNITA amounted to 10 times that of newly independent Namibia. One must question the morality of prioritizing destabilization over development.

Meanwhile, Angola's President Dos Santos and the ruling party, MPLA, were recognized by all U.N. members except for the United States, which refused on two grounds. First, there were Cuban troops in the country. When they were sent home in 1989, there was only one condition left: the holding of free and fair elections.

When those were held, Savimbi reacted in a manner that defies all reason. Having been clearly defeated, he could take up a nice house in Luanda and be the official opposition leader. But then Savimbi is not known for his reason.

We have yet to hear a confession of wrong-doing from our government (even though U.S. officials have been calling and pleading with Savimbi to accept the results). Such pleading is too little too late. Haven't we learned that it's difficult to discipline our dictators? If more Angolans die in Savimbi's attempt to shoot his way into the State House, the blood will be at the door of the White House.

Having assisted in the brokering of the peace accord, the United States must sustain its responsibility for ensuring that peace actually emerges—even if that means cutting ties with an old friend (and admitting the failure of our foreign policy).

Clinton has inherited an embarrassing legacy--one that will result in years of distrust from the people of Angola and the region as a whole. Visible, generous support of the democratically elected government of Angola is essential if justice is to be achieved.

Judy Diers was a free-lance journalist based in Windhoek, Namibia and an assistant in strategic planning for the University of Namibia when this article appeared.