Militarism is the most deadly sickness known to humanity. Some 25 million human beings have died as a result of warfare since 1945, and countless others have been maimed, tortured, starved, or otherwise stricken by this scourge. And despite all the talk of detente and interdependence during the past decade, militarism is more virulent than ever.
It is a scourge that threatens us all. The effects of militarism on the industrial societies are profound: high rates of military spending requiring cutbacks in social and educational programs; maintenance of a permanent military establishment with control over a disproportionate share of the nation's wealth and resources; cultivation of jingoism, suspicion, and xenophobia in order to justify a permanent state of war "preparedness." But the ravages of this scourge are even more brutal in Third World societies, which have fewer defenses against its effects.
Consider: Military spending by Third World countries in 1980 reached an estimated $100 billion--far more than the combined gross national product of the world's 50 poorest nations. Such spending, moreover, is expected to surge much higher in the years ahead as ambitious Third World governments proceed with multibillion-dollar plans to acquire complete arsenals of modern arms. Iran alone spent some $30 billion on imported arms during the reign of the shah, and comparable amounts are being allocated by several other Middle Eastern governments. Arms spending of this sort now exceeds by a large margin all the funds provided by the advanced nations for Third World economic development and consumes scarce resources needed for internal economic development. At the same time, it helps sustain the trend toward military government that is sweeping through the Third World with such devastating consequences.
As we enter the '80s, it is evident that Third World militarism is reaching epidemic proportions. Not only is there a marked increase in military and paramilitary violence, but the growing traffic in arms threatens to wipe out any chance for genuine economic development in the decades ahead. But while the principal victims of this pestilence will be the people of the Third World itself, we will not escape its effects in the industrialized countries. As witnessed by the brutal slayings of American missionaries in El Salvador, and the economic dislocations produced by the turmoil in the Persian Gulf, militarism is a scourge whose ravages cannot be confined to any region or locale.
In charting the pathology of Third World militarism, several conditions appear particularly malignant:
• Authoritarianism. On the grounds that "national security" requires a high degree of economic modernization and that high rates of growth are possible only in tightly disciplined societies, more and more Third World military leaders are assuming control of the governing institutions of their countries. In some cases this process leads to the violent overthrow of civilian governments (as for example, in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Bolivia), while in others it is characterized by the progressive enervation of civilian institutions to the benefit of military agencies.
In carrying out their "developmental" programs, the military tends to impose centralized, hierarchic forms of decision-making on all government institutions, and to place all other national institutions--the press, schools and colleges, the church, trade unions, peasant organizations, etc.--under central state control. Institutions, social groupings, organizations, or individuals that resist such control tend to be considered a threat to "national security" and forcefully dissolved, restricted, purged, or neutralized by the agencies of the state. Furthermore, to obtain the external financing, technology, and investment considered essential to promote the Western-sponsored "developmental models" that most Third World military regimes have adopted, more and more governments are imposing punishing "austerity" measures that inflict disproportionate hardship and suffering on the poorest and most disenfranchised sectors of the society.
• Armamentism. In order to enhance their own self-image as powerful, modern institutions or to intimidate possible foreign rivals, the military forces of most countries are diverting more and more resources to acquire advanced weaponry. This phenomenon is most advanced in the Persian Gulf, where spending on imported weapons now totals some $25 to 30 billion per year, but is increasingly evident in other Third World areas. At the same time, in order to assure a high degree of popular support for increased arms spending, militarized regimes tend to exaggerate external threats and to encourage nationalistic and xenophobic feelings. Both these trends tend to generate local arms rivalries, because any military buildup in one country will naturally cause insecurity and thus matching military spending in neighboring countries.
This process is especially visible in the Middle East, where every new arms purchase by Israel is almost automatically followed by acquisitions by the front-line Arab states (and vice versa) but can also be detected in South Asia, North Africa, and South America. Those who suffer most from this phenomenon are, of course, the poorest sectors of these countries. But in the long run, we all stand to lose, since such local rivalries, fed by the aggressive arms marketing of the great powers, can easily explode into armed conflicts and conceivably trigger a global war.
• Misuse of resources and technology. It is becoming increasingly obvious that many of the earth's critical natural resources will soon be depleted if present-day rates of consumption prevail. At the same time, it is apparent that changes in the global "ecosphere"--many of them produced by human activity--threaten to limit the supply of foodstuffs at a time of rising birthrates throughout most of the Third World. These developments suggest an urgent need for international action to conserve critical resources, protect the environment, and develop new sources of food and other vital products.
However, not only is the epidemic of militarism making such cooperation increasingly unlikely; it is also hastening the advent of global catastrophe by consuming enormous quantities of scarce economic and technical resources. This pattern of waste is most debilitating, of course, in the Third World, which has so few economic resources to begin with. Every dollar (or deutschmark or ruble) spent on arms purchases or military facilities represents one dollar less with which to eradicate hunger and poverty. And every scientist or engineer working on military programs represents the irreplaceable loss of human talent so desperately needed to solve the crippling problems of underdevelopment, famine, and disease.
• Internal violence and terror. Since all of these developments are occurring at a time of generally rising expectations on the part of the world's people for improved material conditions and increased personal freedom, and because the military's objectives naturally tend to be achieved at the expense of the most disadvantaged sectors of the population, the interests of the military authorities and those of the masses of poor people grow further apart. Since in many countries the poor have obtained a small degree of power, or at least self-expression, through the formation of unions, peasant and farmers' organizations, neighborhood and barrio committees, and, in some cases, political parties, the ruling authorities often feel compelled to employ indiscriminate terror and brutality to deter popular resistance. This process is perhaps most advanced in Chile and Argentina, where the military leadership has attempted to eradicate through mass executions an entire generation of political activists, but it can be seen in many other societies where martial law has become a permanent way of life.
These four conditions are present in almost all Third World countries afflicted with militarism. But what causes this malady? American political scientists tend to look at the internal factors which promote militarism: unjust economic and social systems which generate a high degree of internal discontent and disorder; persistent tribal, ethnic, or religious conflict; inefficient and corrupt civilian institutions; the survival of colonial and precolonial military elites; etc. In such analyses, it is customary to regard these factors as some sort of inherent consequence of Third World "backwardness"--as if authoritarianism and repression were somehow intrinsic to underdevelopment and poverty. But it is essential to remember that militarism is a communicable disease and that many of the manifestations of this disease in the Third World were not indigenous but exported to them by the industrial powers for their own profit and gain.
Consider: Between 1973 and 1977, the advanced countries sold the Third World an estimated $52.3 billion worth of arms, ammunition, and instruments of warfare. Not only did this trade in death exceed all forms of developmental assistance from the developed to the undeveloped countries, but it also created the stockpiles of arms that are now being used with such ferocity in the Persian Gulf. The death trade is not limited to arms, however, but encompasses other commodities which promote militarism, including police and prison gear, military technology and training, military advisers and technicians, and, perhaps most devastating, military doctrine and ideology, such as the so-called "national security" doctrine that is used to justify so much oppression and brutality in the Third World.
Four processes, in particular, appear critical in the communication of the disease of militarism:
• Political manipulation. Throughout history imperial powers have sought to expand or guard their empires by suppressing indigenous leaders and replacing them with local warlords who agree (or can be compelled) to serve the imperial cause. Although most overtly colonial arrangements of this sort have now disappeared, the practice persists in the efforts of the major powers to promote the rise of friendly military elites in client states.
External support for friendly military forces typically includes cash subsidies, arms deliveries, military training and technical assistance, political recognition, and other benefits. As a result, Third World armies are increasingly coming to resemble the forces of their benefactors. And even when big-power involvement does not extend to direct intervention, it is obvious that the transfer of such resources (particularly of arms and equipment for internal repression) will contribute to the ascendancy of the military sphere at the expense of competing civilian institutions.
• International arms marketing. Many of the advanced nations have concluded that they must export arms in order to retain a domestic munitions industry at a time of rising military costs or to help reduce balance-of-trade deficits brought about by the rising cost of raw materials. Since, moreover, many nations now possess the capacity to produce weapons, there has been a growing competition between the arms exporters, which, in turn, has led them to use a variety of hard-sell techniques--if not outright bribery--to induce increased military spending by the arms-importing countries. And, as competition between the major exporters has increased, they have offered increasingly more lethal and sophisticated weaponry to prospective buyers, leading to a steady increase in the war-making capabilities of the poorer countries.
Linked to the trade in conventional weaponry are several other factors that also contribute to the spread of militarism: 1) the growing trade in police weapons and other repressive technologies (anti-riot devices, torture equipment and techniques, surveillance gear, prison hardware, etc.), whose use tends to parallel the encroachment of the military over the civilian sphere; 2) the sale of arms-making technologies by the advanced countries to the less-developed countries, thereby permitting an increasing number of countries to become self-sufficient in war-making commodities and to enter the arms trade on their own; 3) the sale of nuclear power technologies which, as demonstrated by the case of India, can lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and 4) linked to all of the above, the sale of military technical skills and expertise, which has inevitably resulted in the transfer of military doctrine and ideology from the industrial to non-industrial societies. All these factors obviously enhance the power of the state--and particularly of the military sector--vis-a-vis the population at large and tend to promote the use of force to solve internal and international disputes.
• Alliance politics. Military alliances are presumably forged in response to clearly perceived dangers, but often these linkages acquire a life of their own that persists long after the original danger is past. In such cases, the governments involved perceive a vested interest in the survival of the alliance as a system, and thus intervene in the political process of member states to assure their continued adherence to the pact. Thus, in the name of "mutual security," the United States has intervened directly and indirectly in many Third World countries to assure the survival of pro-U.S. regimes, and the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan for much the same reason. Alliance politics are also used to justify the transfer of "internal security" technology--including police and prison gear, surveillance and intelligence systems, etc.--on the grounds that a strong central government is essential to the preservation of the pact.
• Big power intervention in local conflicts. Finally, because the major powers tend to view regional power shifts, whatever their cause, as a potential threat to their global power situation, they often attempt to influence the outcome of local struggles by providing clients with arms, training, cash subsidies, and other forms of support. Once such support is provided, moreover, other parties to the dispute almost automatically seek similar assistance from a competing great power. And since the major powers tend to equate their security and prestige with the fortunes of their clients, they are usually quick to match or outstrip any arms deliveries made by another great power to its allies with stepped-up aid of their own--a process that tends to accelerate in tempo until one side or another chooses to exploit (or pre-empt) a temporary advantage by going to war.
As we have seen so often in the Middle East, these local rivalries can erupt in intense, bloody conflicts which consume vast quantities of military hardware (whose eventual replacement by the great powers sets off a new round in the local arms race). But big-power involvement need not be limited to the supply of arms: As the superpowers become more committed to the survival of particular Third World regimes, they are more likely to intervene directly when those regimes appear threatened. Thus we have witnessed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the growing U.S. involvement in El Salvador. At this point, both the U.S. and the USSR appear to be girding up for further intervention in the Third World, and given the growing tension and discord between them, it is entirely possible that such action will precipitate a direct superpower confrontation and even a nuclear war.
All these processes have facilitated and accelerated the spread of militarism from the developed to the undeveloped countries with the devastating consequences described above. Theoretically, military transfers provide Third World countries with the means to protect themselves against foreign invaders, while spurring modernization and providing the atmosphere of security which is the prerequisite for development and progress. Nothing, however, can be further from the truth. In reality, arms sales tend to produce insecurity rather than security, stagnation rather than development, and oppression rather than enlightenment:
• Insecurity rather than security. In theory, arms transfers promote security by enhancing a nation's self-defense capabilities and thus deterring aggression by its neighbors. There are, of course, times and places in history where this has been the case. But the problem with this approach is that it assumes the arms trade is a static, controllable system whereas in fact it is a dynamic, uncontrollable system. That is, when a country buys arms from one supplier, its rivals are likely to buy even more arms from another supplier, thus forcing the original country to buy even more arms to keep up, which in turn triggers still more purchases by the rival, thus producing an ever-expanding arms race until one or another side goes bankrupt or goes to war. And even when this process does not lead directly to war, it produces an ever-heightened atmosphere of insecurity which in turn is used to justify the progressive militarization of Third World societies.
• Stagnation rather than development. It is often argued that arms sales promote development by transferring modern technical skills and capabilities to Third World countries. Thus the airstrip a country builds to house its jet fighters can also be used for commercial planes, and the mechanics trained to service the fighters can also use their skills on civilian aircraft. To some extent this is true--countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia now have an elaborate network of modern airports and a large pool of jet aircraft mechanics--but is this really the kind of "development" Third World countries need? Experience suggests it is not.
In most Third World countries, the greatest need is for basic agricultural and labor-intensive industrial development which promotes employment and economic self-sufficiency. Military sales on the other hand promote capital-intensive, high technology development which enriches a tiny technocratic elite at the expense of the vast majority of urban and rural poor. What is even more damaging is that this process actually retards development by increasing a country's technologic dependence on the advanced countries--which supply the know-how and machinery for these specialized industries--and by cultivating a top-heavy military bureaucracy which seeks to consume an ever-increasing share of the nation's limited resources. The end result: a warped model of development which produces revolt and chaos, as in Iran, or increased poverty for the majority, as in Brazil.
• Oppression rather than enlightenment. Having spurred the development of a militarized elite with control over a nation's resources, arms sales then perpetuate its domination over the rest of society by providing the military and police authorities with the means to suppress dissent and exterminate democracy. For the sad, untold story of the arms trade is that a large proportion of the weapons sold by the U.S. and other suppliers to Third World countries is intended not for external use, against foreign rivals, but for internal use, against domestic political rivals. And while this trade may not be as damaging in purely economic terms as the conventional arms trade--a thumbscrew costs far, far less than a supersonic jet--it probably constitutes the greatest single bar to development by exterminating the democratic institutions which are essential to economic and social progress. Finally, the military trade encompasses not only arms and equipment, but also the value systems which go along with them--authoritarianism, belligerency, intolerance, xenophobia. Such values are totally incompatible with development, in any meaningful sense, and ultimately incompatible with human survival itself.
Although the arguments used to justify military exports are seriously flawed, they have gained new currency in the Reagan administration. Already the White House has moved to increase arms sales to favored Third World regimes and has asked Congress to lift restrictions on exports to countries like Argentina and Guatemala, which have been cited for persistent human rights violations. The administration has also annulled former President Carter's ban on sales of sophisticated weapons to Third World countries and on the sale of arms-making technologies. Not content merely to supply arms and technology, however, the administration has also deployed U.S. military advisers in El Salvador and has announced plans to station U.S. combat forces in the Middle East.
Needless to say, these moves are all being described by administration officials as contributions to world peace and security. History suggests, however, that the more likely outcome will be war. Indeed, U.S. arms transfers have already intensified the level of fighting in El Salvador and have escalated the arms race between Saudi Arabia and Israel. These moves, and similar actions taken by the Soviet Union to aid its allies and clients, suggest that future Third World conflicts will be fought at much higher levels of violence than those of the past. And while previously such violence has been largely confined to the Third World alone, it will prove increasingly difficult to do so in the future. Because the two superpowers are so deeply involved in the military programs of their allies, and because they appear increasingly committed to the survival of loyal regimes, it is becoming more and more likely that future Third World conflicts will trigger a superpower confrontation and even a thermonuclear war.
It is obvious, therefore, that we too are threatened by rampant militarism in the Third World. And since, as we have seen, this scourge is largely sustained by international military transfers, we have a vested interest in curbing the export of arms and other military systems to the Third World.
Michael T. Klare was a fellow of the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington, D.C. when this article appeared. He is the author of two IPS books: Supplying Repression: U.S. Support for Authoritarian Regimes Abroad and Beyond the Vietnam Syndrome: U.S. Interventionism in the 1980s.
Got something to say about what you're reading? We value your feedback!