RICHARD STEELE AND ANITA KROMBERG work in South Africa for the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and direct much of their time and energy into the End Conscription Campaign (ECC). Steele spent one year in military detention in 1980 as a conscientious objector. Steele and Kromberg speak here as activists intimately involved with the ECC, but not as formal representatives of it. -- The Editors
Orlando Redekopp: How did the End Conscription Campaign emerge?
Richard Steele: ECC grew out of conscientious objector (CO) support groups around the country. A change in legislation in 1983 extended the recognition of CO rights to peace church objectors but not to religious pacifists.
People began to realize if recognition of CO rights was not to be extended to the whole range of objectors, the immediate challenge was conscription per se. Anyone asking for the right to object is recognizing the principle of the state's right to conscription.
ECC has always been very clear to lobby straight at the government. The whole campaign has been based on educating people to join the campaign. ECC is very involved in counseling, explaining the different options and consequences regarding conscription.
Since 1981, when Peter Moll and I went to jail for our CO stance, many more have challenged the conscription law. Between then and when the law regarding COs was actually changed to accommodate the main peace church objectors, 15 COs were imprisoned. Since legislation came in 1984, more than 1,000 have been recognized as conscientious objectors (including Jehovah's Witnesses); this is a significant increase in the number of people who have applied for recognition by the state as COs.
There is a definite increase in the level of discontent and unwillingness to serve in the South African Defense Force (SADF). And there are lots of reasons for the unwillingness, including pacifist and personal objections-somebody has a small child, a good job, debts to pay.
Another reason for discontent is the feeling that blacks are integral in the economy. Recently a man called to go into the townships said, "I'm a shop manager, and you're asking me to go into the township where I draw my employees, my labor pool. So I'm going to sit in a Caspir [armored personnel carrier] and shoot at my employees and their families? I can't do that." We are dependent on the townships for labor.
Do more conscripts consider conscientious objection because troops have gone into the townships?
Richard Steele: Absolutely. In our counseling work, we find that is the most common problem. If you were a soldier in the old days, you used to go up to the Namibia-Angola border, but now you go to the camps in the townships near your hometown. That is the pressure -- the border war has been brought back home into your own hometown and township, and people cannot cope with that.
In a sense the government is forcing a generation of white males to become politicized, because people who go into the townships as security force members become politicized in one way or another. Because of the position of threat and the brainwashing they get, they often become extremely reactionary.
It often works the other way around as well: The first time they go into townships is the first time they see the conditions people are living in, even if they are driving in a Caspir. They go in during police and military actions, see the brutality of their fellow conscripts, and suddenly become extremely worried about what is going on. This has the effect of raising the contradictions for comfortable, white, suburban South Africans. People are slapped up against the contradictions of the country.
How do you do your campaigns? You can't work in the public schools, for example.
Anita Kromberg: The base of the campaign is essentially a campaign to change the law; that's our legal protection. Our ultimate demand is for an end to conscription because we believe conscription does four things.
First, it is a violation of fundamental human rights -- the freedom of choice and the freedom of conscience. There is not adequate recognition of the CO, and people are forced to kill and forced to defend a particular political system. Second, conscription fosters or exacerbates civil war -- literally it is neighbor fighting neighbor.
Third, conscription increases the militarization of our country, which means the economy is more and more oriented to the production of munitions and servicing of the military forces of the country. Fourth, conscription helps to maintain the illegal occupation of Namibia. The Namibian political situation is even more tenuous than the situation here, and if it were not for the South African Defense Forces, Namibia could be free.
We can no longer give those four reasons in the media because the current emergency regulations say you are not allowed to criticize conscription or undermine the system of compulsory service or bring it into disrepute. We tend now to focus more on our "interim demands": first, adequate recognition of COs, selective as well as universal objectors; second, the CO's service should be of an equivalent length as the military conscript's rather than one-and-a-half times, which is the case now; third, CO service should be opened up to include working in non-government institutions like churches or community organizations; and fourth, conscripts in the army should have a choice -- the right not to go into the townships and into Namibia.
What is your style of politics? Who belongs to the ECC?
Richard Steele: The way the ECC functions is quite new in South African politics. It is a coalition of organizations, not an organization by itself. Our activists are composed of those individuals committed to ECC and to other organizations -- Black Sash and other women's organizations, National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), churches -- all these are basically affiliated.
We have to represent the views of all those organizations, from the Progressive Federal Party youth (PFP) to more radical groups, to balance out all those interests represented. It is a very difficult thing but also a good thing because that is the test of South African politics. We feel quite good about it as a model of consensus for politics in general, because it is a model of regional autonomy where there is some centralized coordination, but regions make decisions for their areas and for the organizations that are affiliated with them.
We are a single-issue organization, another unique feature. We are focused on the issue of militarization and conscription. We don't have policy on the kinds of political structures that should exist after liberation, or even the forms of the liberation struggle, or the Release [Nelson] Mandela Campaign (RMC), or disinvestment. Our issue is conscription, and we see that as a vital issue in the political terrain because a minority government cannot rule without force and the prime force is the military.
Therefore, we identify that as the pillar of support that is crucial for the maintenance of our society, and it is the one pillar of support that affects every white South African family. It is an issue for white people, because the government is calling us to be in the army.
We are also very well organized structurally. We are very democratic, not hierarchical or centralized. We try to be non-sexist too -- leadership comes equally from male and female. We also try to maintain what we call "acting in good faith." We completely avoid any kind of scurrilous activity, and we try to situate ourselves in the mainstream of politics in the country.
How do you respond to the presence of informers?
Anita Kromberg: If someone has a fairly good reason to suspect that there is an informer, that person is asked to take the information or suspicion to the coordinating group in the region and not to talk about it with other members. The coordinating group then appoints a few people to do some actual investigation of the suspected person, trying to establish whether there is in fact some reason for suspicion. Then the coordinating group will meet with a lawyer and the person to put the suspicions to the person with an independent arbitrator present. This often may not prove anything, but we do sometimes, if necessary, put it to a person that their presence is causing a problem for the organization and ask that they consider leaving the organization in order to further the work of the ECC.
If the rumor is completely unfounded, then the coordinating group will take this back to the person who brought the suspicion and move on to a positive campaign to build up the person, negating the damages of the rumor that could happen. This is more often than not the problem: A rumor arises because someone has a troubled past, which is not reason to suspect a person.
Unions in South Africa have stuck to union issues, but now they are entering the political arena with demands such as a living wage or a one-person, one-vote election system. Do you feel pressure to expand your arena? What is the scenario for the future?
Richard Steele: We see ourselves as sticking with the one issue, partly because it is a model of change in that there are many issues that need to be addressed, issues of injustice and oppression, and one organization (unless you are a super-organization) cannot address all the issues adequately.
We are the only organization that is directly working with the military issue, and we require all our energy, time, and commitments for this issue, although other individuals in ECC work with other groups. When a conscript questions his call-up, he is questioning his whole political conditioning and socialization. It is actually very radical. If someone questions his call-up, he often begins to think of broader issues and then joins other groups.
What have been the reactions of black groups? Did they understand why you took up this issue?
Richard Steele: Initially they didn't understand; white politics and the white community seemed irrelevant to them. The original stance of COs seemed to be merely that: an individual person's stance.
It was only as the ECC took some shape and became a political force and the state started reacting -- which was a stamp of approval -- that black groups began to see that it was not just a white issue. And when the troops began to move into the townships, they began to see it was a black issue as well: The white soldier was behind the gun, but the black South African was in front of the gun. It is now seen to be a joint issue and understood as necessary to change in the white community.
Anita Kromberg: Our first major campaign was the "troops out" campaign in September 1985, when we began a fast to get the troops out of the townships. It was the first anniversary year of the invasion of the townships. Now "troops out" is a national call; we popularized the phrase in a way, although it had come from the townships. Now you see the youth -- the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), for example -- having one of their goals as getting the troops out of the townships. We have an immediate affinity with township organizations.
Another major campaign in 1986 was the "Working for a Just Peace" campaign, where throughout the country we worked on joint construction projects with black community organizations. It was another attempt to foster non-racialism in our own organization. The reason we are not going into the SADF is because the SADF perpetuates racialism and division. So we have a very good working relationship with black organizations, not just the national ones like the United Democratic Front (UDF), but also with local groups.
Are there various ways one can be democratic? The UDF has democratic impulses within it, too, right?
Anita Kromberg: The main difference is the degree of participation. We try to mitigate centralization of authority in decision making. We have coordinating committees which in some regions call themselves an executive, but they are primarily coordinating bodies.
Coalition politics is starting to emerge more and more in South Africa. Individual unions belong to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the UDF, like the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and NUSAS belongs to ECC and the UDF as well.
We have tried to evolve a style of organizing which is not only effective but also consistent with what we are opposing. We are opposing the military which is organized in a particular fashion, and we are opposing the government which has a particular mode of organizing. So we are trying, as far as possible, to incorporate the alternative. We try also to incorporate the personal dimension of politics, to fuse the personal and political, which is a unique feature of the ECC.
Could you give us some details as to how you actually do your campaigns? You went into the townships themselves, didn't you, on your "troops out" campaign?
Richard Steele: Our primary purpose is for action, and that is how we draw people. Our first campaign was in 1984 and was called NO WIN -- No War In Namibia. Also that year, we had a "declaration against conscription" which stated our political sympathies. It described the political context: The land is in the hands of a few, and we call for a just peace.
We took that declaration around, and we got various organizations to endorse the declaration. Then we publicly launched the ECC and the declaration in late 1984. That was a good thing (and I see the Coalition for Illinois' Divestment from South Africa has done the same thing). We had the organizations' support and also their protection; the South African Council of Churches (SACC) has been a protection, for example.
The next major event on the calendar was a national conference in January 1985 that had a total of 28 representatives from Cape Town, Johannesburg, and Durban. The sum total of the activists was about 30 to 35.
What really put us onto the national map was the idea of a National Peace Festival. The festival was held for three or four days in July 1985, which was in the middle of the winter vacation period of the universities and schools. It was at the Wits University and took the form of seminars, workshops, and cultural works including theater and music.
We invited Paulo Evaristo Cardinal Arns, but his visa was refused at the last minute. We received a lot of publicity about that plus we had dozens of supportive statements from around the world. All of a sudden we had a national forum of about 2,000 people, an international profile, and good media coverage within South Africa.
Then we decided we wanted to coordinate our first national and regional campaign, which was our "troops out" campaign. It was at that meeting that the fast came out as a symbol for the "troops out" campaign. We planned the campaign for October, and it was centered on getting troops out of the townships and the matter of choice for conscripts.
We are always trying to relate the campaigns to the conscripts and the fact that conscripts are forced to participate in a civil war, in the repression of their neighbors, in support of apartheid, and that troops in the townships militarize the political situation. The fast was chosen as a physical manifestation of the choice.
We felt that a lot of people saw the presence of troops in the townships as inevitable, and that the troops had no choice but to go in. The purpose of the fast was to cut through the sense of inevitability. As it turned out, four national ECC people were detained: Sue Britten, Mike Evans, and both of us. The detentions were a tremendous boost to our campaign because we were already planning to start our "troops out" campaign, and I was going to begin a fast in Durban. We were detained about two months before the fast was due to start.
In April 1986 we had the "Work for a Just Peace" campaign. We did more work in the townships. In Port Elizabeth the ECC group helped to build tables, chairs, and benches for a creche [day-care center] in New Brighton, a black township. They made the furniture right in the townships; people would come by and observe them working and ask questions.
This was a very difficult time in the eastern Cape; the period between late '85 and mid-'86 was the hottest time in that area. The declaration of emergency was essential from the government's point of view as things were escalating, groups were mushrooming, and there was a massive revolution, with the eastern Cape as the hottest spot.
The image we tried to project was that troops with guns going into the townships inspire fear and hatred and violence, while we go into the townships with tools and friendship. It worked very well. There were absolutely no hassles, none of us experienced any animosity except from the security forces, and we were given hospitality, breaking some important stereotypes.
The state of emergency was declared June 12, 1986. So the first campaign we ran, in September '86, was centered on ECC's right to speak. We drew up a petition which we took around to all our prominent supporters to sign, saying we believe that the ECC should have the right to speak. It was important to contact our base this way, and there was no comeback by the government after that.
Then we did local campaigns. Durban did an anti-war toys campaign; in Cape Town, the ECC joined a planned major peace walk from a white area to a black area, in the middle of the emergency. Eventually the police said they could not guarantee the safety of the marchers, and threatened to stop the march. It was a threat by the police that they could not guarantee that they would not shoot.
More recently we are getting into the "war is not compulsory" campaign. The reason for the slogan is partly the sense of inevitability about war, and the perception that everyone is sliding toward the precipice and that we have to fight.
You say you might be declared an "affected organization." Are you expecting this?
Anita Kromberg: We expect a crackdown just because it is such an essential issue we are addressing; constantly we are being labeled as worse than the African National Congress (ANC). In fact, we have been lumped with the South African Communist Party (SACP). The authorities mentioned this when we were in detention. Basically the fear is that we are taking instructions from the ANC to undermine the defense force in order to promote the armed struggle.
In police questioning we learned that because we have traveled quite a lot overseas, they think we are couriers who meet the ANC to pick up instructions and then inform the organizations in South Africa to pass on the strategies and the tactics. Every time they raise the issue of the ECC publicly, they talk about the ANC and the ECC, trying continually to connect the two in the public mind.
There is no basis for that in fact, and there is no substantiation for it. The way ECC's structure operates prevents that kind of thing, because it is an open, democratic organization. We could never have a person bringing in instructions or strategy and have our organization go along with it.
We also hear from soldiers that there are lectures about the ECC in the army. One chap said that in their lectures they ask, "Who is the enemy? Is it the terrorists?" The soldiers reply, "No!" "Is it the kaffirs in general?" "No!" "Is it Moscow?" "No!" "Who is the enemy?" "ECC!"
It is a compliment in a way because it raises the issues. Some people have never heard of the ECC until they get in the army.
Do you think you will be banned?
Anita Kromberg: We can't tell. We have set up certain contingency plans if we are banned, or declared an affected organization, and that is about as much as we can do. We are also careful; we try to remain within the law, because we don't want to give the authorities an excuse for banning us. If we are banned, we want the public to give them a hard time so we can try to conserve the organization. And yet we try to get the maximum profile that we can because they could decide to ban us anyway, even if we do nothing.
If we were banned, we would move laterally as activists to join other organizations. Because the issue is so pervasive, a particular organization or structure is not essential. It would be a blow if we were banned, but there would be continuity in the issues because the call-ups of the conscripts won't stop.
What is the best way for groups in the United States to be supportive? What should the international community do?
Richard Steele: First, letters from international support groups if ECC people are detained are very important. Having international recognition provides a degree of protection because South Africa is still sensitive to international pressure. What we would like internationally is for people to know that there is a vociferous element in the white community that is opposing apartheid in a costly fashion and that there is a vociferous opposition to conscription.
We calculate that at least 10 to 15 percent of the conscripts don't report for call-up. People don't know that overseas. The situation tends to be simplified that all whites are bad and all blacks are good.
People must take the militarization of the white state seriously, because that strength is essential to its continued domination of the majority. If we want to bring about a change, we have got to be able to weaken that ability to rule.
This interview, which took place in southern Africa in spring 1987, was conducted by Orlando Redekopp, a Church of the Brethren pastor who has worked in Botswana with Mennonite Central Committee. When this interview appeared, Redekopp was also a member of Synapses, a grassroots, interfaith network in Chicago that focuses on apartheid in South Africa as well as many other U.S. and international issues. Synapses arranged the interview and contributed to initial preparations of the transcript.
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