Shifting Terrain in Korea

Imagine the situation if Jimmy Carter had not gone to North Korea this summer, and if Kim Il Sung’s death had come in the midst of a still-escalating crisis. Would the growing tension have led to war?

We’ll never know, of course, how profoundly Carter’s visit changed the course of history, and it is far too early to tell if Kim’s successor will defuse or escalate the crisis. But the response to the ex-president’s personal peacemaking gives us an extraordinary window into the struggle for the soul of American foreign policy—which, in the context of Clinton’s weathervane approach to international affairs, is seemingly up for grabs.

Critics described Carter’s visit to Pyongyang as "appeasement" (The New Republic), "capitulation" (Charles Krauthammer), or an "embarrassment" that served only to "induce yet another American retreat" (Henry Kissinger) and called for punitive sanctions, economic isolation, and even military strikes against the last communist holdout. In contrast, the response from the region was a collective sigh of relief as tensions eased in the wake of Carter’s visit; one Western diplomat in the area said that "the whole diplomatic terrain out here just shifted."

The contrast in responses illustrates the vastly different interpretations of what was at stake. Some defined the issue narrowly in terms of nuclear proliferation, and focused almost solely on how to stop the North Korea bomb. Others, especially those most closely affected, took a broader view—with 1.5 million soldiers staring each other down across the 38th parallel, prevention of the Korean War Part II and the building of trust between the two nations were key.

Stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is indeed a crucial issue. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, there are now eight acknowledged members of the nuclear club and three countries that have nukes but won’t admit it (Israel, India, and probably Pakistan). In addition, there are seven more countries, including North Korea, with the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons in the next few years.

This summer’s standoff developed when North Korea obstructed inspection of its supposedly commercial nuclear facilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), apparently to hide the extraction of weapons-grade plutonium. The treaty, which has been signed by 162 countries and comes up for review next spring, has two components. Non-nuclear signatories agree to forgo nuclear weapons and submit facilities to inspection. Countries that already possess the weapons agree to share nuclear power technology and to move toward the abolition of their own nuclear arsenals.

that’s why the U.S. charges of North Korean treaty violations ring so hollow. The United States—along with Russia and China—have clearly not held up their end of the bargain; the nuclear "haves" are certainly not moving towarding eliminating their nuclear weapons. In fact, the U.S. government continues to fight World Court efforts to declare such weapons illegal, and still stands as a major obstacle to a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing.

At issue in the North Korean plant, according to the CIA, is about 80 pounds of enriched plutonium, enough to build four or five bombs. That’s bad news, to be sure, but have we reached a similar crisis over the 100 to 200 warheads that Israel has produced (with absolutely no international inspection)? And those numbers pale in comparision with the U.S. arsenal, which contains about 259 metric tons of weapons-grade material and somewhere between 20,000 and 25,000 warheads.

North Korea is said to be diverting the plutonium either because it really wants the bomb for security or, alternatively, to give it a bargaining chip in broader negotiations. It takes a certain amount of chutzpah (not to mention hypocrisy) for the U.S. government to condemn such reasoning, since American security has been defined in atomic terms for five decades. And have we conveniently forgotten the "bargaining-chip" rationale that the Reagan team used to justify the Euromissiles of the ’80s?

But the more fundamental issue here is how to deal with conflict in the international community. It’s not just a question of whether to brandish sticks or offer carrots. Carter’s visit to North Korea transformed the confrontation from the threat/counterthreat of global power politics and opened a door to a genuine conversation and negotiation—because he was willing to take a risk and actually listen to the other side, on a human and personal level. We’ll never know what the process unleashed might have produced had Kim Il Sung lived, but it’s a safe bet that without Carter’s risky pilgrimage, the world would be a more dangerous place.

Politicians often claim that force is the only voice that speaks with any authority in international affairs, which can prove to be a self-fulfilling prophesy if no alternative is raised. Because of his faith, Carter refuses to accept the cynical notion that human beings have no resort but violence when, as inevitably happens, conflicts arise between nations.

The commitment to nonviolent peacemaking has its risks, of course, and will most likely be misunderstood by those who believe that everything from child rearing to international relations is best accomplished by force. But, as Wendell Berry writes in his latest book, nonviolence is perhaps the only way the world’s warring ways will be transformed.

Peacemaking, Berry writes, "has been too little tried by individuals, much less by nations....It does not afford opportunity for profit. It involves danger to practitioners. It requires sacrifice. And yet it seems to me that it is practical, for it offers the only escape from the logic of retribution. It is the only way by which we can cease to look to war for peace."