On the Threshold of a New Era

The "post-mortems" of the Nicaraguan election have now been recorded. Far from edifying, they amounted to an unseemly spasm of credit claiming. Success has many parents, and Washington's pundits and politicians have been tripping over each other claiming responsibility for the UNO (National Opposition Union) victory at the polls.

Supporters of Oliver North and defenders of former President Ronald Reagan's contra policy crowed that the Sandinista defeat represented a vindication of the war they sponsored. Administration officials proudly asserted that President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker deserved the accolades for their continuing efforts to squeeze the Sandinistas diplomatically and economically. Democrats wanted the spotlight focused on Costa Rican president Oscar Arias and the Central American peace plan for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

What is unmistakably true is that Daniel Ortega lost because the Nicaraguan voters believed, probably correctly, that re-election of the Sandinistas would not translate into a definitive end to the contra war or into desperately needed economic revitalization. In the end, as President Ortega himself admitted, the voters let their stomachs decide.

Unfortunately, Washington has been congenitally unable, as in other tragic foreign policy adventures, to examine underlying assumptions and ask the tough ethical questions about means and ends. Left completely unexamined, for example, is the dubious right of a superpower to throw its weight around by laying siege militarily and economically to a small impoverished country. From the beginning of this long, costly struggle, the ability of the United States to make the Sandinistas--and the Nicaraguan people--suffer was never in doubt. The U.S.-inspired war and embargo, while unsuccessful in dislodging the Sandinistas by force, nevertheless did wreak havoc with the government's genuine effort to feed, clothe, and educate the people.

The Sandinistas mortgaged their economy and traumatized their society to fight Washington's war. For years, more than half of their meager budget was directed toward the military. The GNP dropped by half. A major structural adjustment program imposed in 1988 greatly reduced the public sector and sent prices spiraling. Purchasing power dropped by almost 80 percent.

The war resulted in the deaths of approximately 35,000 people, many of them civilians. The contra attacks (on cooperatives, church people, and others) continued even up until election eve. In short, Washington was ultimately able to make the Nicaraguans "cry uncle."

THE SANDINISTAS THEMSELVES certainly are not faultless. Their zealous application of the revolution alienated many people.

Most of Nicaragua's peasant population is historically conservative, and has consistently resisted any government (the Sandinistas included) telling them what to do.

The Central American peace process launched by President Arias at Esquipulas in August 1987 created the conditions for the Nicaraguan elections. Had congressional support for the contra war continued, there would have been no elections and no triumph of the Violeta Chamorro-led opposition.

Like voters everywhere, the people of Nicaragua voted in their self-interest. They rationally opted to vote a ticket that held out the hope for economic rehabilitation and a definitive end to the long nightmare of war.

Washington's war in Nicaragua cost U. S. taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars. The taxpayers will again have to bear the burden of rebuilding what U. S. policy destroyed. This new financial burden comes precisely at the time when the United States is least able to provide the whopping amount of aid ($300 million has been requested by the Bush administration) required to begin recovery for the devastated Nicaraguan economy. Some voices on Capitol Hill were overheard groaning that the United States simply could not afford any more victories.

Moscow, doubtless, must have been enormously relieved. After all, they have passed the buck to Washington for helping to feed and clothe 3.5 million Nicaraguans. Surely Moscow must enjoy teasing Washington about the possibility of continuing military aid to the new Chamorro government.

NICARAGUA STANDS POISED on the threshold of a new era. The future rides on the ability of the UNO coalition and the Sandinistas to put aside historic quarrels and join together in the mutual task of rebuilding a battered land. In defeat Daniel Ortega pointed the way by saying that through the electoral process Nicaragua would find "that peace and that stability which we so need to reconstruct this country, to lift up the economy, to free well-being in the official areas, and aspire to a minimum of political stability. "

For Daniel Ortega's vision to prevail, several important actors must cooperate, not the least of which is Washington. Washington's "Rosemary's baby," the contras, remain poised along the Nicaraguan border, threatening to undermine the critical transition phase. In the company of former President Jimmy Carter, just after the election, President-elect Violeta Chamorro called for the immediate demobilization and resettlement of the contras. She subsequently reneged on that pledge. A Chamorro-appointed delegation emerged from a meeting with contra leaders in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, praising the contras for making a contribution toward democracy in Nicaragua.

Recent events seem not to have shaken Washington's chronic equivocation and lethargy regarding a final resolution to the "contra problem." Some signals coming from the State Department suggest that its version of demobilization might include moving armed contras into "enclaves" in Nicaragua, a solution completely unacceptable to the Sandinistas. Another non-starter put forward by the contras is that their demobilization be predicated on a similiar scaling back of the Nicaraguan government's army.

Complicating efforts to resolve this nettlesome issue are serious divisions within contra ranks. The contra leadership is sending conflictive signals regarding its intentions and desires.

The Ortega vision could also be undone if Washington does not take the historic step of conferring recognition to the defeated Sandinistas. Paradoxically, the Sandinistas may be able to achieve in defeat what they were never able to achieve in victory--acceptance in Washington. The transition, including the controversial surrender of authority over the military and security forces, could be accelerated if Washington could summon the dignity to declare that the Sandinistas have conducted themselves as model democrats, and that the political process that led to their defeat would be respected should they return as victors in an election six years hence.

In fact, the presence of a genuine left-of-center political party could have profound implications not only for Nicaragua, but also for the entire region. Critics of Washington's aggression toward the Sandinistas often suggested that Washington's motivation was driven by the fear of a successful socialist revolution in Latin America.

In defeat, the Sandinistas may become another kind of model. As the Sandinistas institutionalize themselves into a party structure, they could become a model for legitimate nonviolent, leftist struggle within a constitutional framework. For the new UNO coalition to be able to govern effectively, it will have to rely, even as Washington must rely, on the cooperation of a strong, united Sandinista opposition party.

The role of the Commission of Support and Verification (CIAV), created by the Organization of American States and the United Nations as part of the peace plan, in the coming months also will be crucial not only for Nicaragua, but for El Salvador as well. As the CIAV proceeds with its primary task of disarming, demobilizing, and repatriating the contras, valuable lessons learned will likely have great relevance for the wrenching process of national reconciliation in neighboring El Salvador, and perhaps even Guatemala.

At the March 12 inauguration of the new Chilean president, Patricio Alywn, Daniel Ortega and Vice President Dan Quayle had a long conversation in which Ortega reiterated his pledge to facilitate the transition to UNO, declaring that UNO could name all the ministers they want (including Defense and Interior). In restating their fealty to respect the integrity of elections, the Sandinistas once again demonstrated their commitment to the peace process that began in earnest on August 7,1987, at Esquipulas.

From the outset, Washington has given only lip service to the peace plan. The onus is now on the White House and Congress to demonstrate through deeds that they are prepared to cooperate with the Arias plan. Those deeds can be made incarnate by helping to heal the wounds Washington opened--by providing strong financial support to the CIAV and to other international agencies dedicated to helping resolve the contra issue and bring economic recovery to Nicaragua.

Based in Washington, D.C., Joe Eldridge was a longtime missionary with the Board of Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church and a former director of the Washington Office on Latin America when this article appeared.