CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA -- There is war and peace in South Africa. Instead of promoting political tolerance and initiating reconciliation, the country's political leaders are locked into a fierce battle for power -- a battle that has forced the people in the black townships to withstand violence that has killed more than 3,700 people nationwide in the last 22 months. More and more, a cry is going out from ordinary South Africans to institutions such as the church to intervene in the conflict.
Over the last few months, the African National Congress (ANC) has drawn from the weapons of its old armory -- sanctions, boycotts, strikes, and mass action -- to combat the South African government's thinly veiled pre-election campaign. The ANC has singled out in its attack the government's implementation of a comprehensive new tax system, which further burdens the poor and pre-empts a revised tax system under a new constitution; and the killing of people in the townships by certain "off-duty" reputed police officers (the so-called "third force" in the violence) and Inkatha members (a predominantly Zulu organization).
The ANC has gone as far as suggesting that foreign loans contracted by the present government -- to embark on their multi-billion-dollar reform program to pay for "backlogs" in black education, housing, social services, and health care -- might not be honored by future "democratic" (ANC) rulers. And what came as a big blow to international investors was the statement by ANC president Nelson Mandela that the ANC still supports nationalization as an option to address the economic imbalances in the country -- an idea most business people in South Africa believed the ANC had shelved.
Nationalizing the mines would empower workers, achieve a higher minimum wage, and lead to better working conditions, says the ANC. Nationalizing the banks, it claims, would enable the government to funnel money directly into productive investment rather than leaving this to self-interested private institutions. Economists are concerned that a predicted ANC-dominated government will spell the end of foreign investments and funds for socioeconomic growth if it goes the route of confiscating mines and banks.
To create jobs for South Africa's almost seven million jobless, any new government would have to find at least $200 billion to foot the bill. Providing homes for the more than eight million homeless who are staying in shacks or under bushes would require approximately $300 billion -- an amount 20 times that of the total annual budget of the South African government.
CLEARLY THE ANC FEELS that the government is trying to compensate for its past and strengthen its hand before it has to compete in an open, democratic election. Should the ANC come to power, it has no intention of paying for its political opponent's election campaign bill.
On the other hand, F.W. de Klerk, leader of the troubled Nationalist government, denies ANC allegations that he is trying to win political points with his massive reform programs. And while the ANC is holding fast on its demand for an interim government, the Nationalists maintain this would be unconstitutional, and at present seem unwilling to concede more than discussions around the issue at the Multi-Party Conference slated for late this year.
Among whites, de Klerk has lost much of his power base through what they consider "radical" reform. The white right wing remains adamant about non-participation in the Multi-Party Conference or in any negotiations with the ANC.
Meanwhile, pressure on the government persists from abroad. As "punishment" for ongoing arms trade with Iraq, the Bush administration has recently imposed three more sanctions on all South African import and export of military technology and hardware. This adds to the existing list of seven remaining sanctions by the United States on trade and intelligence relations with the South African government.
Contrary to what the anti-sanctions lobby claims, lifting the remaining U.S. sanctions on trade and loans with South Africa will not put the oppressed masses necessarily in a better economic position. Without exception, all of the restrictions already allow for investment in black upliftment and development, as well as trade with non-governmental agencies.
What further complicates matters for de Klerk's government is the claim made by white right-wing political parties at a recent press conference in Pretoria that 55 percent of Defense Force officers and almost 70 percent of the police force support the Conservative Party.
It is an open secret that the government is not always able to exercise full control over its security forces. The right wing is openly mobilizing its members into "commandos" to prepare for a takeover of government when the de Klerk government "betrays" the white Afrikaner nation by handing over power to, or even seriously negotiates with, the ANC. There is evidence that disguised right-wing elements were responsible for many of the recent township killings.
As Clarence Makwetu, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) leader, recently said, "There is a force of well-financed, well-trained hit men who do these things and then disappear without a trace." He then posed the question: "How could an Inkatha or ANC gunman who opened fire in a crowded train know he wasn't killing his own people?"
Initially, the ANC believed these killings were aimed at destabilizing the movement in the townships and boosting support for Inkatha. Now the objective appears to be to damage the whole peace process and stop negotiations at any cost.
Drawing political battle lines and planning strategy to obtain or keep "power" by the main political players have done little for the very people the battle is supposedly all about.
According to a recent opinion poll of more than 3,000 South Africans by the Institute for Black Research, 73 percent of South Africans support immediate and ongoing negotiations between the ANC and the Nationalist government to bring about change in South Africa.
IN THE MIDST OF seemingly endless confrontations and accusations between the government, the ANC, Inkatha, and the labor unions, the church has recently resumed its role as a champion of justice and peace -- a role from which it was sidelined by political events over the last two years.
"Since the watershed speech of Mr. de Klerk on February 2, 1990 [in which he legalized more than 60 opposition groups, including the ANC, and opened the door to negotiations on a new constitution], the church has been trying to adjust to the fast-changing political scene," says Father Smangaliso Mkhatshwa. "Most of its struggles for social justice have been taken over by the political organizations."
In what some observers called a "fundamental turning point in the history of South Africa," the church in September brought together 24 leaders of the main parties in the conflict -- the ANC, Inkatha, and the government -- to pledge themselves to the pursuit of peace, reconciliation, and political tolerance in a land torn by violence.
The Peace Accord was conceived by, among others, Rev. Frank Chikane of the South African Council of Churches (SACC), Johan Heyns of the Dutch Reformed Church, Archbishop Desmond Tutu of the Anglican Church, and Dr. Louw Alberts, a prominent Christian businessman and scientist. Initially, the accord was an attempt to curb the violence, but it expanded in scope as it emerged from the process of negotiations with all of the political parties.
Nelson Mandela commended the Peace Accord as carrying the "seeds for important principles in the transition and future democratic society" and creating "an opportunity for peace." President de Klerk, a co-signatory of the accord, stated that "the darkness of violence is making way for the light of peace."
Commenting on the role the church is and will be playing in the "new South Africa," Father Mkhatshwa says, "It goes without saying that sometimes there will be tensions between the church and political leaders. But if both respect one another's functions, the tensions will be creative.
"Someone must heal the wounds inflicted upon our people by years of oppression, repression, injustice, exploitation, and racism. We need someone to preach and foster the values of justice, unity, national reconciliation, forgiveness, compassion, and the sacredness of human dignity."
And this is what Chikane and Alberts did behind the scenes during the months of delicate pre-discussions with the different conflicting parties in drawing up the Peace Accord. Alberts described the drawing together of the mutually antagonistic parties as a "miracle from God."
With the accord, the authors hope to create a political environment in which parties can freely express their views. It recognizes that parties can differ. But they should express their differences openly and peacefully, and ensure that their members co-exist in a spirit of mutual tolerance.
A recent edition of the ANC's official organ Mayibuye described the accord this way: "Over the years, the police have related to the majority of the people as their enemies. The accord calls for a reversal of this, and proposes the establishment of liaison structures between the police and communities; and the setting up of a Police Board -- comprised partly by members of the public -- to review training and recruitment. This is an important departure from the old code of conduct.
"By proposing measures for socioeconomic development, the accord acknowledges that a society based on the deprivation of the majority cannot be at peace with itself," the ANC editors concluded.
Since the signing of the Peace Accord in September, there have been fewer reports of direct violent clashes between supporters of Inkatha and the ANC; but disturbing accounts are frequently surfacing in the press of well-planned attacks from alleged "trained hitmen." Clearly, the white, right-wing militants are posing a real threat to a lasting peace process.
The success of the accord, which is not expected to be fully implemented until February 1992, will depend largely on the introduction of a code of conduct for the police force that holds its members accountable to all people in the country. If those police officers belonging to the white Conservative Party -- the only main party that did not sign the accord -- do not adhere to this code, the peace process could run aground.
Commenting a month after the signing of the accord, Archbishop Tutu expressed his confidence in the start of negotiations based on an "undoubted commitment of most of the major political players to a negotiated and reasonably peaceful resolution."
The hope and expectations around the accord were recently summed up in a prominent South African newspaper: "History may yet select this accord, rather than the constitution which is still to come, as the birth certificate of a nation."
Hannes Siebert was editor of Cross Times magazine in Cape Town, South Africa when this article appeared.
The Peace Accord has called for the following:
- a code of conduct for the police that holds members of the force accountable to society -- not to the government;
- a commitment by political parties to democratic tolerance;
- a National Peace Committee to monitor and enforce the Peace Accord and resolve conflict at the local and regional levels;
- a statutory commission to investigate and expose the roots of the violence;
- the appointment of a Police Board -- with members of the force and the public equally represented -- to advise on future policing policy;
- a special police unit to investigate allegations of misconduct by members of the force;
- a special independent unit to investigate political violence;
- and the establishment of special courts to deal solely with cases of political violence.
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