It was fitting that the first global dialogue between leaders of rich and poor countries would be set in Cancun, Mexico. Amidst scenic Mayan ruins, reminiscent of Mexico's lost, resplendent past, the 22 leaders (eight from the industrialized world and 14 from developing countries) gathered on this exclusive resort island, overlooking the crystal blue waters of the Gulf of Mexico. In the nearby shantytown of Cancun City, however, the abject poverty of the native Indians bears symbolic witness to Mexico's present and the impoverished lot of the entire underdeveloped world today. But if the economic contrasts of Cancun's surroundings helped to dramatize the purpose of the talks, they also served as a troublesome reminder of all that was left undone when the accords ended.
To be sure, the talks were neither intended nor designed to complete any specific agreements between the countries involved. Rather, the goal was to move beyond rhetorical proposals and ideological jockeying to create a congenial political atmosphere from which future, more substantive talks could emerge. But even this unassuming end was only partially fulfilled. A member of the Brazilian delegation summed up the results as positively as he could: "Our expectations were so modest that the disappointment cannot be too great." If Cancun provided an important, though tiny, first step forward along the pathway of global negotiations, it also highlighted a substantial rift between the rich and poor, foreshadowing a massive roadblock not very far ahead.
While the historical roots under-girding the present confrontation lie in the centuries-old colonial domination of the South by the North (as the poor and rich countries have become respectively designated), the structural roots of the debate emerged from the economic ruins of World War II. With the European and Japanese economies shattered by the devastation of war, the United States, as the only surviving industrial power, was left to lead the way toward a global economic reconstruction that would maintain Western dominance, with the United States as the foremost power.
Three international institutions were created to play key roles in this recovery: the World Bank; the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Among these three, large-scale rehabilitation loans and debt refinancing were arranged, and international trade guidelines were established. While the institutions, over time, have opened their vaults to the needs of underdeveloped countries, the definition of need and the conditions of assistance have remained firmly in the control of the industrialized world.
At the heart of the North-South controversy is the issue of control. Will the North continue to dominate the international mechanisms of finance and trade? Or will the decision-making power be shared more equitably with the South? The question of control was only just below the surface at Cancun and will be the sink-or-swim issue in any future global dialogue.
The plight of the South is horrendous and getting worse daily, particularly among the oil-importing majority of underdeveloped nations. The per capita income of the Third World relative to the industrialized North has fallen more than 50 per cent since World War II and will plummet even further by the end of the century. The South populates three-quarters of the globe, but shares only 20 per cent of the wealth, and that figure is dropping too; with exploding inflation and high interest rates, $2 out of every $3 of new loans to poor countries go simply to service old debts; and entire countries, such as Costa Rica and Bolivia, are on the verge of bankruptcy.
To help overcome this persistent downward spiral, the South wants more aid from the North and more control over the international mechanisms governing its economic life blood: control over the prices of raw materials, broader trading opportunities, and a larger voice in the World Bank and IMF, where voting power now is weighted in favor of rich nations.
Since the momentum for global talks began several years ago, the United States' response has varied from cool to frigid. Jimmy Carter refused participation in any discussions at all. Ronald Reagan finally agreed to attend Cancun, but only after his conditions were met, which included Fidel Castro's absence and an agenda that sought no specific goals or agreements. With several Northern countries increasingly open to the South's hopes, the United States' isolated, dilatory posture betrays little interest in changing the global economic status quo.
In rebuttal to the South's plea for more aid and global participation, Reagan argues "the magic of the marketplace." After Horatio Alger, the Reagan formula for successful Third World development is self-reliance and hard work: "Our message at Cancun will be clear. The road to prosperity and human fulfillment is lighted by economic freedom and individual initiative." He even raises the United States as an example to emulate: "Few countries are less developed than we were when the original settlers arrived here. They faced a wilderness where poverty was their daily lot and danger and starvation their close companions."
Such paternalism and ideological sloganeering fail the test of history and present reality, and deny the impact upon the Third World of United States economic policy and domination. Had the United States been under foreign economic domination in the 18th century similar to what the Third World suffers today, young America, even while murdering and stealing the resources of the native population, would never have made the economic strides it did.
Neither will the Third World be released from the grip of poverty until it has been freed from the dominance of the North. This point is understood well by the South. After the United States recently flooded the international silver market with more than 100 million ounces of silver, Peru and Mexico, major exporters of silver, were enraged over the precipitous drop of silver prices to below $9 per ounce. Lamented Peruvian economist Claudio Herzka, "Freedom of commerce is the basis of Reaganomics but the U.S. has intervened in the marketplace in a big way to protect its internal interests. We see a split personality in this." Facades of public liberality are easily unmasked in the face of self-interested manipulation.
Perhaps the Reagan administration's most serious flaw in approaching the North-South dialogue is the East-West blinders that severely restrict its vision. To view the South's struggle for economic independence primarily in terms of a communist world-free world conflict is to seriously misunderstand the real issues. It is curiously telling that while heralding political and economic freedom as the solution to the South's development crisis, Reagan champions the repressive countries of South Korea and Taiwan in his showcase of Third World successes.
Michael Novak, United States Representative to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, said last spring that "our government--our people--do not believe that development is a right. An opportunity, a noble aspiration and a duty--but not a right." But while the Reagan administration may feel that three-fourths of the world's population does not have the right to share in the resources of basic human survival, the biblical witness says otherwise.
Joe Roos was on the editorial staff at Sojourners when this article appeared.
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