Ronald Reagan's space weapons plan is unlikely to ever block a nuclear warhead in the heavens, but it may prove to be an effective shield against any possibility of an arms agreement here on earth. Reagan's intransigence on the issue of weapons in space continues to be the greatest obstacle to U.S.-Soviet progress toward negotiated disarmament.
On January 15, Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev announced a dramatic proposal designed to lead to the abolition of all nuclear weapons by the end of this century. The Gorbachev initiative was well-received by the Reagan administration and gave promise of a potential breakthrough in the nuclear logjam, except for one major catch: Star Wars. Gorbachev stressed that preventing the escalation of the arms race into space was an essential component of the plan. Reagan replied that U.S. space weapons research was "non-negotiable."
Along with the three-stage disarmament plan, the Soviet leader announced a three-month extension to March 31 of the unilateral Soviet nuclear test moratorium that was slated to expire December 31, 1985. The test ban is the most crucial component of the Soviet initiative and the step that would be the easiest to accomplish. To finally achieve a ban on nuclear testing, a goal that has been pursued for more than 30 years, now requires only a decision by President Reagan to end tests.
The Pentagon has claimed a test ban "would entail serious risks to the safety and reliability of our nuclear deterrent forces." Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) replied that such arguments were "a smokescreen the Pentagon and the weapons labs have developed to try to defuse the growing public clamor for a test ban." Markey said, "The administration's real reason for opposing a test ban [is] its desire to develop new counterforce weapons like the Trident 2 [missile], and its fascination with nuclear star wars weapons such as the X-ray laser."
The alternative to the test ban is to continue the current approach to arms control, which is to keep building new weapons while the talks in Geneva go on. In the 1970s that process ordained the tripling of the U.S. and Soviet arsenals while 10 "successful" negotiations took place.
Gorbachev's surprise January proposal demonstrated that the Soviets apparently learned a lesson from last year's testing moratorium. When Gorbachev finally made the official announcement of the test ban on July 29,1985--three months after it was promised--Reagan officials responded immediately with a series of half-truths and out-and-out lies that branded the Soviet test halt as mere "propaganda" (see "A Window of Opportunity," Sojourners, November 1985). The compliant press dutifully echoed the official line, generally without questioning the accuracy of Reagan's "facts."
The 1986 disarmament plan came to public attention in an entirely different manner. The proposal was made public only a few hours after it was delivered to Reagan in a letter from Gorbachev. The administration had not expected a new proposal from the Soviets during the current round of talks in Geneva and was therefore unable to exercise in advance its considerable skills in perceptual management. The U.S. press was left to respond to the Gorbachev proposal on its substance.
IT IS THE substance of the plan that is most impressive. The first stage consists of three components: the test ban, the renunciation of space weapons, and the reduction by one-half of the nuclear arms that can reach each other's territory, down to no more than 6,000 for each side.
Reagan has long claimed that on-site verification is necessary to prevent Soviet cheating on an arms agreement. One of the key elements of the Gorbachev plan is the proposition that verification would be carried out both by current methods, such as spy satellites and seismic monitors, and through on-site inspections. Reagan may continue to claim that concern for verification prevents the United States from entering into an agreement with the Soviets, but, with technical advances and offers of on-site inspection, it is clearly an excuse to disguise other motives.
One of the most surprising aspects of Gorbachev's proposal concerns medium-range weapons in Europe. Up to this time, the Soviets have insisted that since British and French weapons were aimed at the USSR, they should be counted along with U.S. weapons in assessing the West's total. The new plan calls for the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range weapons while freezing the British and French arsenals. Reagan's response demands the elimination of Soviet medium-range missiles in Asia, but still ignores the nuclear forces of Britain and France.
Phase two would begin "no later than 1990" and would involve other nations joining the testing and space weapons ban and the superpowers reducing and then eliminating their medium- and short-range nuclear weapons. The third stage, scheduled to begin in 1995, envisions the elimination of all nuclear weapons before the year 2000.
The Gorbachev plan presents the world with another opportunity to escape the Damocles sword of nuclear weapons. While Reagan's insistence on going ahead with space weapons stands as a major obstacle to progress in disarmament talks, the real barrier is that Reagan and his advisers have never wanted negotiated disarmament or any other kind of disarmament. And they do not want it now.
Saying no to space weapons now opens a possibility of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons. By continuing with the research and development of space armaments, we may be throwing away one of our last and best chances for peace.
Jim Rice is editor of Sojourners.
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